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Darwinian Reasoning and Waltz’s Theory of International Politics 
Elimination, imitation and the selection of behaviours 
 
Abstract 
There are important parallels between the pattern of inference Kenneth Waltz uses in his 
Theory of International Politics and early Darwinian reasoning. This early Darwinian 
thinking has needed to be significantly refined by modern evolutionary biologists, and their 
amendments are equally relevant to Waltz’s model. Waltz allows for states to imitate each 
other, and also accepts that they are only rarely eliminated from the system. Modern 
Darwinian analyses show that where elimination is rare and imitation common it is quite 
possible for deleterious behaviours to become widespread. We cannot assume an anarchic 
system will select for security-enhancing behaviours in major powers. Thinking about 
Waltz’s argument in these terms opens space to disagree with his conclusions while 
respecting the strength of his logic.  
 
Introduction 
In his conclusion to Realism and World Politics1, Booth develops an analogy between the 
work of Kenneth Waltz and Charles Darwin. There are further fundamental parallels between 
the two which he leaves unexplored. Both propose models of how selection within complex 
systems causes the units to converge on certain kinds of behaviour. Darwin shows that most 
of the animals2 we see around us have physical characteristics, and instincts, which are 
almost ideally suited to surviving in their environments because members of past generations 
which were poorly adapted did not survive and reproduce3. Waltz predicts that major players 
in the international system will behave in ways which are suited to surviving in anarchy4. In 
Darwin’s model, units which do not conform with the constraints of the selective system are 
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either eliminated or fail to reproduce. In Waltz’s model, the major powers show relatively 
little variation in their behaviours in the present because they too are the survivors of 
competition among units in the past. But both rely on assumptions about how selective 
systems would have shaped the population of units which constituted them in the past. Both 
involve assumptions about how selection in the present will shape that population in the 
future. 
   These two thinkers are giants in their fields, and for good reason. However, both of their 
models have been criticised for capturing only part of reality. Over the course of the twentieth 
century neo-Darwinian biologists have refined, and in some cases rejected, elements of 
Darwin’s own thinking, while retaining his central insights. The parallels between Waltz’s 
reasoning and Darwin’s mean that some of these critiques may also be helpful in refining 
Waltz’s ‘neorealist’ approach to international relations. Clarifying the parallels allows us to 
tap into over a hundred years of biological thinking on Darwin’s legacy5.  
    In this paper I examine Waltz’s underlying argument that significant states will tend to 
behave prudently, and draw some parallels with how Darwinians reason about biological 
evolution. Waltz argues that diversity of states’ behaviour is reduced partly by elimination. 
States which behaved inappropriately in the past were likely to “fall by the wayside”6 and 
were either conquered or relegated from geopolitical significance (like Austria or Sweden). 
Their nonconformist behaviours followed them. However, Waltz’s argument cannot rest on 
elimination alone. He appears to rely on the impact of a few eliminations being multiplied by 
their exemplary effect, which causes surviving states to imitate the behaviour of their most 
successful competitors, further reducing the variety of behaviours present among significant 
states7. Yet Darwin’s modern successors have shown that this kind of imitation may not 
automatically make a selective system evolve, because it imports the inherent weaknesses of 
what evolutionary theorists call a Lamarckian model.  I argue that the system Waltz describes 
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cannot enforce prudent behaviour by itself unless states are guided by policy prescriptions 
which themselves seem distinctly neorealist.  
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Darwin and Theories of International Politics 
Darwin’s name carries a great deal of unfair baggage in the social sciences, which may 
conceal the usefulness of modern Darwinian thought8. I should make clear at the outset that 
this is not an argument about human nature and that I am not claiming that Waltz appeals 
directly to Darwin – although there is an indirect link between them. 
    There is an established tradition of using Darwin’s ideas in international relations theory – 
or more accurately there are two radically different traditions, which conveniently fall into 
two of Waltz’s “images” of international politics9. Darwin’s name and Darwinian reasoning 
have been used explicitly to justify claims about human nature, providing “first image” 
explanations for the pattern of international relations. For example, Thayer10 claims that 
Darwinian ideas can bolster the classical-realist contention that human nature is incompatible 
with global co-operation, a claim based on the belief that we can extrapolate from the 
challenges humans have faced in our evolutionary history to our modern behaviour11. 
Darwin’s ideas have been used more often to support generalisations about human nature 
than to analyse the evolution of relations among states, despite the logical difficulties of 
generalising about individuals and a compelling intellectual case for analysing the evolution 
of state systems in Darwinian terms12. When I discuss Darwinian ideas in this paper I am not 
really thinking about the “first image” implications of Darwinian thought but about “third 
image” uses of quasi-Darwinian ideas.  
   The “third image” concerns the complex system which emerges from interaction among 
states. This system both shapes, and is shaped by, individual states’ behaviour13. The 
dominant traditions in the field characterise this system as anarchic. Anarchy is seen as 
rewarding states which behave in particular ways, therefore we can allegedly form reliable 
expectations about states’ behaviour. States will tend to behave in ways which anarchy has, 
historically, rewarded. Although portraits of neorealism have been particularly explicit in 
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their use of Darwinian ideas14, other traditions also accept that anarchy constrains states to 
behave in particular ways. They disagree largely about what behaviours selective systems 
will reward in their constituent states. 
   These “third image” accounts of social evolution have dismissed some common objections 
to analogies between the evolution of social institutions and biological forms15. For example, 
it makes no sense to reject such analogies on the basis that social institutions, unlike animals, 
have unlimited lifespans. Evolutionary processes affect the frequencies of different traits 
within a population, and what kinds of units exhibit the traits is incidental16. Provided that 
institutions like firms and states can recreate themselves enough to alter their behaviour, the 
same basic logic applies as if they were regularly giving birth to new institutions. Imitation 
can transmit behaviours between groups, allowing innovations to circulate between social 
institutions (like states) just as sexual recombination diffuses favoured behaviours and 
characteristics through a biological population. The basic principle that Darwinian reasoning 
can be applied to the evolution of social systems seems well-founded.  
    These parallels between economics and evolutionary biology nourish a flourishing subfield 
of ‘evolutionary economics’17. As a result, there is an established dialogue between the two 
fields which has kept evolutionary economists up-to-date with modern developments on 
Darwinian thought. By contrast, few IR scholars maintain close intellectual links with 
‘modern’ Darwinian biologists18. Where Darwinian ideas are present in international politics, 
there is a risk that understandings of Darwinism fixate on essentially nineteenth century 
evolutionary biology, and underestimate the sophistication of modern Darwinian theories. 
These theories, like Waltz’s Theory of International Politics, rest on the selection of 
behaviours and characteristics coded in individual genes rather than a competition between 
animals per se.  
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The Economic Analogy and Darwin 
Waltz did not self-consciously set out to apply Darwin’s theory of evolution to international 
politics. Waltz does not appeal to Darwin (or other evolutionary biologists) to support his 
theory. Darwin appears only a handful of times in Waltz’s major works19, and never as a 
model for Waltz’s own ideas. But there is a plausible indirect route by which Waltz could 
have been influenced by early Darwinian ideas, through the assumptions about selection 
which were made by Darwin’s contemporary followers before the ‘modern synthesis’ 
revolutionised Darwinian thinking in the early twentieth century20. These influenced several 
contemporary economists21. 
   While Waltz is generating his model of international politics, he returns again and again to 
analogies with microeconomics22. States, the units of selection, are compared with firms in a 
market. Just as firms have to remain profitable in order to survive, so Waltz’s states have to 
retain enough power to avoid becoming easy victims of their competitors. Both firms and 
states can also imitate successful competitors. This analogy also parallels Darwinian biology 
(Table One). 
 Waltz economists biologists 
units states firms animals and other 
organisms 
system international-political market ecological 
Table One: The politics/economics analogy, and its relationship to Darwin 
    To construct his analogy, Waltz relies heavily on the work of economists whose arguments 
paralleled early Darwinian work. The most obvious is Joseph Schumpeter23, perhaps best 
known for his slogan of “creative destruction”, the idea that the survival of only those firms 
best-adapted to consumer demands gives the economy as a whole its dynamism24. Waltz 
began his academic career in the 1940s and 1950s, when he was most exposed to economic 
theory and began graduate work in economics25. The economic theory of that period has been 
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shown to be heavily inspired by ideas of the survival of the fittest firms in a competitive 
marketplace26. While Waltz himself does not link his model to the evolutionary theories and 
principles of selection developed by nineteenth-century naturalists, the economics of his 
youth was informed by early Darwinian assumptions about how selective systems work. For 
example, early Darwinians tended to imply that the odds of a behaviour being retained within 
the system would vary directly with the success of the unit which displayed it. It should not, 
therefore, be too surprising that Waltz’s model has a lot in common with early Darwinian 
thinking. Many modern Darwinian theorists in both biology and evolutionary economics have 
a very different perspective. 
    At its most fundamental level, Darwinism is one way of explaining why units in a system 
evolve over time. Charles Darwin himself did not generate all the theory which has since 
become associated with his name. Darwin was born into a society which generally accepted 
that species had changed over time but struggled to explain why without invoking divine 
intervention. His new contribution27 was to offer a viable mechanism to explain why this 
change came about. The mechanism was natural selection. Put simply, siblings’ traits vary 
(for reasons Darwin could not specify) but only some of these traits – physical characteristics 
or behaviours – are suited to the environment. The siblings with suitable traits prosper at the 
expense of the others, produce more offspring which tend to resemble them, and fill the 
world with well-adapted animals.  
    Darwinian theory offers a particular way of reasoning about how units in a selective 
system are likely to behave. Units whose behaviour is compatible with the environment will 
tend to leave more descendents, which will resemble them more than their competitors. 
Therefore, compatible behaviours will become ever more common and incompatible ones 
ever rarer. Many Darwinians have argued that under many circumstances competition among 
units is likely to cause an approximation of ‘rational’ behavior to emerge. For example, 
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optimal foraging theory suggests that foraging animals’ behavior will converge around 
strategies which tend to offer the greatest calorie yield per hour of effort28. Inefficient 
foragers will be more likely to die before reproducing, and so with each generation foraging 
becomes more efficient – or would, were the environment not also in a constant state of flux. 
The numerical superiority of the well-adapted units will enable them to dominate the 
selective system itself, thus changing the selective environment faced by units in the future. 
    In Theory of International Politics, Waltz allows that in principle states’ behaviours could 
vary. However, he also sees them as constrained by selection, and goes on to argue that we 
can identify certain behaviours which are better-suited to states’ environment, international 
anarchy. These will be the behaviours which preserve states’ security. States whose 
behaviours do not preserve their security will “fall by the wayside” and no longer be in a 
position to shape the international system. Because this has been the case for centuries now, 
we can expect that the international system of the present will be shaped by security-seeking 
states29.  
    Waltz reasons that, over time, most of the major states will converge around a particular 
pattern of behaviours. He further implies that we can deduce which behaviours are likely to 
be favoured by the system, and anticipate that those behaviours will be widespread. The 
widespread behaviours generate a neorealist international system, which punishes states 
which do not conform to that pattern of behaviour. This is worth examining in more detail, 
because it implies that the distribution of behaviours is key to understanding the system. 
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Structural Realism as Behaviour Selection 
Waltz argues that behaviours which make the state exhibiting them more likely to survive in 
anarchy tend to become more common over time, until eventually they become ubiquitous 
among the states that matter. For a Realist, of course, the behaviour which is almost always 
rewarded by anarchy is the pursuit and preservation of power. Waltz, a defensive neorealist, 
infers that the system is most likely to favour behaviours which enhance power only up until 
the point at which that state’s increasing power starts to become actively harmful to its 
security, by provoking conflict with fearful neighbours30. He expects the behaviours common 
among the major powers to be those which are correlated with the retention of an optimum 
level of power, at which the states are most secure. 
    Waltz reasons that two consequences of anarchy will lead to security-enhancing 
behaviours becoming ubiquitous. The first is elimination, the second, “socialisation”31. Both 
of these have parallels in Darwinian thought. 
 
Elimination in Theory of International Politics 
In principle, sovereign states could behave in a range of different ways. Not all of these will 
improve their odds of self-preservation. The states which dominate the present will be those 
which were selected by the international system in the past. In the past there will have been a 
range of states, some of which behaved in ways that preserved their power, some of which 
did not. Over time states whose behaviour leads to a loss of relative power will be more likely 
to be conquered or relegated from major power status; they “fall by the wayside”32. 
Therefore, states which are significant in the international system today will have been 
concerned to preserve their power in the past, and are more likely than not to behave in ways 
which preserve their power in the present. This behaviour should enable them to preserve 
their position in the system.  
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    Elimination in its literal sense does not by itself explain why major powers’ behaviour 
should converge so strongly. While unquestionably states are sometimes violently eliminated 
from the system, Waltz accepts that, empirically, this is quite infrequent, an objection raised 
by Robert Keohane in the 1980s33. This is a crucial point of departure from microeconomics, 
where the “death rate” for firms is much higher34 (in evolutionary biology, of course, death is 
omnipresent). In fact, Waltz even accepts that the relegation of states from great power status 
is not very common. Nonetheless, he continues to believe that behaviours will converge as a 
result of the possibility of elimination/relegation, stating that  
   I fail to understand why Keohane thinks that selection does not work if the 
death rate of a system’s units is low. Selection does take place more swiftly 
and surely when death rates are high [but where they are low] fortunes 
nevertheless rise and fall... In the international-political system, states wax 
and wane even as their death rates remain low. In the international-political 
system, great powers come and go, although not with great frequency... 
He then goes on to remark that 
... a unit of the system can behave as it pleases. It will, however, fare badly 
if some of the other parties are making reasonably intelligent decisions. That 
some states imitate the successful practices of others indicates that the 
international arena is a competitive one in which the less skilful must expect 
to pay the price of their ineptitude. The situation provides enough incentive 
to cause most of the actors to behave sensibly. 
    Finally, Waltz stresses that neorealist theory alone cannot, and need not, predict 
foreign policy: 
     Just as market theory at times requires a theory of the firm, so 
international-political theory at times needs a theory of the state 35 
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    If anarchy selected only by eliminating and relegating non-conformist states, drawing a 
conclusion that states will behave prudently from these observations would seem odd. This 
passage seems to imply both that processes which occur outside of the model might increase 
diversity of behaviours and that the system will be slow to check this diversity. Waltz does 
not set out to explain how foreign policy is generated. He therefore allows foreign policy to 
be generated outside of the model (presumably within the states themselves), and allows that 
states are free to choose their foreign policies. For example, in his earlier work Waltz 
provided a comparative analysis of how British Prime Ministers and American Presidents 
direct their countries’ respective foreign policies which emphasised the influence of those 
countries’ party systems36, a factor which clearly falls outside his neorealist theory. Because 
they are generated outside of the model, these policies need not necessarily conform with the 
logic of the system. In other words, foreign policy-making processes could increase the 
diversity of behaviours among the states which constitute the system. The status quo is 
always (according to Waltz) dominated by prudent states. If foreign policy generation were 
not constrained by his theory, then Waltz would give us no reason to believe that imprudent 
policies will not be generated as well as prudent ones. Given that the existing states are 
(according to Waltz) almost all going to be behaving prudently, any increase in diversity is 
likely to reduce the average level of prudent behaviour. If elimination of non-conformist 
states were the only force in Waltz’s model, then diversity of behaviours would be reduced 
only by the fact that non-conformist states tend to be destroyed or to become so weak that 
their behaviour becomes irrelevant to the system as a whole. The rate of elimination would 
need to be high enough that imprudent behaviours could not proliferate faster than the system 
sanctioned them.  
    An analogy may help to clarify. States’ foreign policy-making has a place in Waltz’s 
model similar to the place of genetic mutation and sexual recombination in Darwin’s. 
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Mutation and recombination are exogenous to Darwinian theory but, by generating diversity 
among animals on which selection can act, they are absolutely fundamental to explaining 
evolution37. Genetic mutations and sexual recombination are not explained by evolutionary 
theory. They occur as a result of chemical processes at the genetic level, of which Darwin 
himself was of course completely unaware. He simply observed that there was change in 
animals’ characteristics with each new generation, and did not attempt to explain why. This 
change, while not exactly random in a statistical sense, could not be predicted by the theory 
and so might as well be treated as random for the purposes of his argument because it was not 
predicted by any other factor he could account for. By taking the occurrence of random 
variation for granted, Darwin was able to concentrate on explaining how natural selection 
constricts this variation and keeps populations of animals well-adapted to their environment – 
even if that environment changes slowly over time. This created a viable theory when the 
mechanics of heredity were not fully understood.  
    By the same token, it is not necessarily unreasonable for Waltz to simply accept that 
foreign policies are made by forces outside of the neorealist framework and then explain how 
the international-political system limits their diversity38. In fact, he has argued vigorously that 
he does not need a theory of foreign policy. 
    However, if foreign policies are exogenously-generated and elimination is rare then 
elimination alone cannot explain convergence around security-enhancing behaviours. If the 
only force constraining diversity acts more slowly than the force increasing it, then obviously 
diversity will increase. And it would seem that foreign policymaking would be likely to 
increase diversity, if only because it would be difficult for the behaviour of great powers to 
become any more homogenously prudent than Waltz’s portrait of the status quo. Thus, a 
force external to the model is increasing diversity, and elimination of imprudent states is 
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reducing it. But because elimination is rare, it can only slowly reduce the diversity of 
behaviours. Foreign policy-making could well increase diversity faster.  
    Consider this analogy. We know that rabbits can be born black, brown or white, because 
pet rabbits come in all three colours. These represent three different mutations of the gene 
which controls fur pigmentation. In temperate climates, we can predict that almost all wild 
rabbits will be brown. The reason, obviously, is that brown rabbits are less conspicuous to 
predators. Brown is the prudent colour for a wild rabbit to be. While mutations can easily 
generate white and black rabbits, we never see them because they are much more likely to be 
eaten than brown rabbits. But this is only because the mutation rate is relatively low and the 
death rate is high. If the average rabbit had five white and five brown offspring, and on 
average one brown offspring and two white offspring were eaten every generation, there 
could still be many white rabbits in the wild. In the short term mutation and natural selection 
work in opposition to each other, one increasing diversity of fur colour and one reducing it. 
The relative speeds of mutation and selection are important in determining how diverse the 
population is.  
    If behaviours do converge, this implies that either elimination reduces diversity of 
behaviours faster than other factors increase it (unlikely), or that elimination is not the only 
force causing behaviours to converge. And, of course, it is not. ‘Socialisation’ of states into 
the international system appears to be more important in explaining convergence around 
prudent, security-oriented behaviours. His observation that elimination is relatively rare 
emphasises the importance of “socialisation” in Waltz’s model. This imitative process is 
absolutely pivotal, because Waltz cannot predict convergence on prudent behaviours without 
it – and without prudent behaviour by most influential states in the system all the 
consequences of prudence, including the balance of power, do not follow. It is in analysing 
“socialisation” that modern Darwinian theory really becomes invaluable. While Darwin 
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himself might have been comfortable with what Waltz has to say about socialisation, modern 
Darwinian theory suggests that we should be very wary of assuming that imitation leads to 
convergence on prudent behaviours. 
 
Socialisation in Theories of International Politics 
Waltz’s model does not rely entirely on states randomly choosing strategies and suffering the 
consequences (elimination or relegation) if those strategies turn out to be misguided. He 
allows for a degree of intelligent judgment to shape states’ behaviour in response to the 
perceived challenges of their environment. Waltz claims that states learn from their 
competitors. One example prominent in Theory of International Politics is the Prussian Staff 
System39. The staff system was a mechanism by which Prussia transferred some traditional 
functions of army commanders – distinguished battlefield leaders with limited formal training 
– to professional staff officers who were intensively trained in the unglamorous technical 
elements of contemporary warfare, such as planning supply lines. This superior system of 
military organisation was widely believed to give Prussia an advantage over its neighbours, 
contributing to several victories. Once other states perceived this, they quickly developed 
Staff systems of their own.  This process of imitation changed the selective pressure within 
the system, affecting the environment faced by both Prussia’s competitors and Prussia itself.    
    Allowing for states to imitate may appear, superficially, to compensate for the slow rate of 
elimination in international politics compared with economics or biology. Socialation is much 
quicker than the elimination, and so it appears as if behaviours might converge even when 
elimination is infrequent40. The educational example of seeing only a few states which paid 
too little attention to their security dismembered should motivate others to adopt prudent, 
security-oriented behaviours. If Waltz’s states perceive their behaviours to be making them 
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less secure they can change them before they become so badly damaged that they have 
become irrelevant to the system.  
    Thus, Waltz’s model includes natural selection in the system but also allows for states to 
identify and converge on successful strategies through imitation. Imitation creates a simple 
one-way transfer. Waltz’s concept of “socialisation” is a more fluid, dynamic process41. 
When most of the states imitate, this takes on a reciprocal dimension which adds fluidity the 
system. By innovating, Prussia gave its competitors an incentive to innovate, and was briefly 
a ‘role model’. But when its neighbours adopted staff systems this changed the selective 
environment faced by Prussia itself. Now it faced a new environment, and had it reverted to 
its old pattern of military bureaucracy it would have faced serious danger. International 
politics developed a kind of self-generating motion characteristic of a Darwinian system. 
Socialisation is therefore much more than just imitation, but imitation is a necessary 
ingredient.  
    Waltz’s structural theory of international politics is therefore in tension with evolution 
driven primarily by natural selection, which most modern biologists see as the main driver 
most of the time. If animals are born into a world for which their inherited traits are ill-suited, 
they cannot learn new traits to save themselves42 unless they belong to fortunate species of 
intelligent learners (which few do43). But Waltz allows that states can deliberately adopt new 
strategies to save themselves from the wayside. Waltz chooses the diffusion of the Prussian 
Staff system as an example precisely because other states did not retain their existing, less 
efficient structures and wait for their impending defeat by the Prussians44. Instead, 
neighbouring states’ militaries learned from Prussia’s success and imitated the staff system.  
    Imitation can be quicker than elimination, and this learning element of the model means 
that, even without a strong selective effect from differential elimination, behaviours need not 
be randomly-generated. The system appears to influence not only the different fates of states 
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which show particular behaviours, but also influences what behaviours they exhibit in the 
first place.  
     However, imitation in turn raises several questions. Why does Waltz see socialisation as 
necessarily working in the same direction as elimination, rather than opposing it to increase 
the diversity of behaviours? Why should states be more likely to imitate a successful 
competitor?  And how do they restrict their imitation to those behaviours which are 
responsible for its success? States might behave prudently and adopt behaviours which 
enhance their security, or they might adopt behaviours which seem appealing for some other 
reason, or behaviours which only seem to enhance security. 
    What Waltz does not discuss in any depth is why we should expect behaviours which 
enhance the security of the state to be those which are imitated. It might have been taken for 
granted in the economic theory of the 1940s and 1950s that firms adopt strategies which 
enhance their position in a competitive market, but the death rate in these markets is much 
higher. Firms therefore receive much more direct feedback on what works, and will probably 
not exist for very long if they are self-indulgent. This may not be true of states.  
    Identifying which behaviours are prudent is far from a simple task. Consider the 
information necessary to a security-seeking state. Leaders may well wish to imitate a more 
successful rival. Presumably if they wish to imitate a successful rival they would wish to 
copy the behaviours responsible for that success. But there is ample literature on the 
difficulties of predicting whether a policy, or institution, will transfer successfully into a new 
institutional context45. Strategies which work well in some circumstances may fail in others, 
and predicting which contexts will prove compatible is notoriously difficult. For example, the 
staff system which influenced states’ behaviour in wartime (by determining who made the 
strategic decisions, such as the implementation of the Schlieffen Plan) did not operate in a 
vacuum, but had to interact with the military recruitment and even the education systems of 
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the adopting states to produce/select effective military planners. Mistaken imitation is 
therefore a very real possibility. Ideas which worked for the Prussians might not work so well 
in a different institutional context. Imitated behaviours may not be compatible with other 
strategies to which the imitator is committed. 
    The nature of socialisation in Waltz’s model also adds a temporal element to this 
uncertainty. Behaviours which helped one state become secure in the past could be disastrous 
given a change in circumstances. Because socialisation is a fluid process, and each state’s 
behaviour affects the others’ environment, the selective pressure a state faces changes over 
time. Therefore, what is prudent is to some extent in flux. Given the difficulty of predicting 
which behaviours and institutions will be most effective, states will probably make the wrong 
choices as often as the right ones. 
    It therefore seems improbable that states can reliably identify behaviours which will 
enhance their security in advance. This implies that either socialisation generates its own 
equilibrium, according to its own logic, or that states are able to react to constant feedback 
from the system.  
    One possibility is that the process of socialisation itself determines which behaviours are 
appropriate, according to its own logic. This is a possibility because socialisation is 
reciprocal. It is conceivable that a fashion for imitating a particular behaviour could create a 
selective environment which is actually favourable to that behaviour, making units which 
exhibit it more likely to survive, prosper, and be imitated46. If the appropriateness of a 
behaviour depends on the other units’ behaviour, then behaviours which are compatible with 
each other could become sustainable because other states are socialised into them. For an 
evolutionary analogy, consider the magnificent plumage of a male pheasant. This is often a 
liability to males. There is no ‘objective’ reason females should prefer plumage. But once 
enough females do prefer it, females who choose not to are at a disadvantage. Their sons will 
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be less likely to inherit plumage, less likely to attract mates, and less likely to provide 
grandchildren. Such self-generating dynamics are common in Darwinian systems47. A 
fashion for plumage in males, even if it was eccentric when it began, could become self-
reinforcing. 
    While this is one possibility, it does not seem to be what Waltz has in mind. For one thing, 
he is keen to stress the eternal relevance of neorealist prescriptions. If the appropriateness of 
behaviours were contingent on imitation and fashions, they could not be so eternal as he 
suggests. It would also be extremely difficult for an analyst to deduce which behaviours were 
likely to be favoured from his model. 
    The alternative is that states are able to react to constant feedback on their security 
situation gathered from the environment, and will adjust their behaviour to compensate. 
While elimination and relegation of powers to insignificance is relatively rare, Waltz seems 
to have something less dramatic in mind when he says that states ‘wax and wane’. States’ 
relative power may change over time. Intuitively, we would expect that states can react to 
diminution of their power short of elimination, treating this as a sign that their behaviours 
will, in the long run, increase their odds of evisceration in the future. Their competitors might 
also be dissuaded from imitating them. But would this constitute reliable feedback to which 
Waltz’s states would necessarily react? 
    Again, this would be far from unproblematic. Firstly, states cannot necessarily assume a 
linear relationship between power and security. Napoleonic France and Nazi Germany both 
reached the peaks of their power immediately before their security was dramatically 
undermined. The belief that more power can sometimes lead to less security defines Waltz’s 
defensive neorealism. Accordingly, states need some way of knowing whether power-
enhancing behaviours pose a threat to their own security. More profoundly, however, if there 
is a possibility of imitating other states’ imprudent behaviours then modern Darwinian theory 
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suggests that the system will not provide the kind of feedback needed for states to choose the 
most prudent behaviours. 
   To understand why, we need to consider why Darwin’s competition-based theory of 
evolution dominates biology. Darwinian selection is needed to generate the kind of feedback 
which will lead the units in a system to converge on behaviours appropriate to their 
environment. Unfortunately, Waltz’s concept of socialisation seems to have more in common 
with the ‘Lamarckian’ view of selection, which cannot. 
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Lamarck’s Feedback Problem  
Natural selection was not the first superficially-plausible explanation which had been offered 
to explain evolution. In 1809, the year Darwin was born, Jean-Baptiste Lamarck published 
his theory to explain how evolution could occur without God constantly intervening to create 
new species. Lamarck is well-known for the premise on which his theory was based, the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics, now colloquially called ‘Lamarckism’48. Analysts 
who stress the role of ideas and norms in shaping states’ behaviour have tended (implicitly or 
explicitly) to argue that the transmission of ideas between states is Lamarckian49. If 
Lamarckian inheritance were viable, this might mean that socialisation and elimination would 
point in the same direction. States would react to feedback from the system reducing their 
security by constantly learning. Unfortunately, Lamarckian transmission would almost 
certainly not be able to provide that kind of feedback. 
    The distinction between Darwin’s theory of natural selection and Lamarck’s inheritance of 
acquired characteristics is easily explained using the evolution of the giraffe as an example. 
Giraffes have long necks which allow them to eat leaves from the tops of tall trees. The fossil 
record shows that giraffes descend from an ancestor species which did not have the giraffe’s 
long neck50. A Lamarckian explanation would be that members of the ancestor species 
developed a habit of feeding on the highest leaves of very tall trees, and as a result were 
constantly stretching their necks. The repeated stretching would slightly lengthen the neck of 
each successive generation, and each generation would (somehow) pass on this acquired 
characteristic to its offspring. Over time, the habit of stretching for high leaves would greatly 
change the shape of giraffe-ancestors’ necks.  
    Darwin’s new mechanism of natural selection removed the need to believe that 
characteristics which giraffe-ancestors acquired during their lifetime could be passed on to 
their offspring directly. Giraffes’ ancestors would produce offspring with necks of varying 
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lengths. The offspring with the longest necks would be better able to feed from the tops of 
trees, where there was abundant food. The offspring with shorter necks would have to 
compete for leaves on the lower branches, and in the face of this competition would be more 
likely to starve to death or to be undernourished and weak51. On average, they would be less 
able to reproduce or to care for their offspring and thus would have fewer descendents than 
their long-necked relatives. Many would quite literally “fall by the wayside”, collapsing and 
probably being devoured by scavengers. The long-necked giraffe-ancestors would tend to 
produce offspring which shared the same long necks52, until eventually a new long-necked 
species (which humans would call “the giraffe”) evolved.  
    Today, of course, we know that Darwin’s principle of natural selection offers a superior 
explanation for biological evolution. Our understanding of genetics provides empirical 
evidence for this. We know that the genetic content of eggs and sperm cannot be influenced 
by other cells in the body, so changes which occur in other cells during an animal’s life have 
no direct impact on future generations53. However, Charles Darwin himself (writing in the 
mid-nineteenth century) never learned of genes, and he did not have a detailed understanding 
of how sperm and eggs transmit inherited characteristics. While it is tempting to portray 
Darwin as championing Darwinism against Lamarckism, it is not historically accurate. 
Darwin never claimed that natural selection was the only mechanism by which new species 
can evolve54. In fact, he continued to accept that evolution could occur by a combination of 
natural selection and other mechanisms, leaving the door open for the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics55. This idea was only really laid to rest in the early twentieth century, when the 
implications of genetic inheritance became clear. Until then, Lamarckian ideas remained and 
may have influenced economic theorists who in turn influenced Waltz. 
     Empirical evidence that biological evolution is not driven by a Lamarckian process does 
not, of course, mean that the evolution of political systems cannot be Lamarckian. Some 
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economists have believed that Lamarckian imitation drives convergence of behaviours among 
competing firms56, and so, apparently, does Waltz. The socialisation element of his model 
effectively relies on successful states developing strategies, and those strategies being 
imitated. States which try to import new practices to protect themselves are not simply 
making do with the hand Fate has dealt them, as animals do in natural selection. They copy. 
Not only do they copy, but they copy learning from the copying of others. Other states 
learned from Prussia’s staff system, but Prussia itself had to develop that innovation based on 
the challenges of its environment. Prussia was not created with its system of military 
bureaucracy fully formed and immutable. Instead, Prussian officials guessed a new form of 
organisation would be most useful given their state’s environmental challenges and adopted 
it. The new form was then imitated. Unlike animals, states do not have rigidly-defined 
reproductive components – if states inherit ideas from each other, they inherit ideas which 
have been polished and adapted based on years of use. If states inherit, they inherit both 
inherited and acquired characteristics. In “socialisation”, Waltz mixes quasi-Lamarckian 
ideas with natural selection57. 
    But modern Darwinians’ objections to Lamarckism are not based solely on empirical 
evidence. Rather, as both Hodgson and Knudsen58 and Dawkins59 explain, evolution through 
the inheritance of acquired characteristics raises theoretical problems. Modern Darwinian 
analyses show that if Lamarckian inheritance occurs it will not lead to units becoming better-
suited to their environments. When Waltz acknowledges a quasi-Lamarckian possibility of 
inheriting acquired traits, he imports the limitations of Lamarckian reasoning.  
    We can see from the world around us that evolution is not a random process, but one which 
leads to animals remaining well-suited to their environments even as those environments 
change. In order to explain why this occurs, any theory of evolution needs some means of 
distinguishing between beneficial and injurious characteristics. Many if not most changes 
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which occur in animals’ bodies will result from injuries. Animals may tone up especially 
useful muscles, but they also break their teeth and sometimes bones. A theory based on 
natural selection very clearly defines injurious characteristics – an injurious characteristic is 
one which reduces an animal’s odds of leaving offspring. If acquired characteristics are 
inherited, then injuries can influence which characteristics an animal leaves to its offspring 
just as much as any other environmental influence which may affect its lifestyle.  
    Suppose a giraffe-ancestor fell and permanently damaged the bones in one leg. In order to 
continue to walk, it would need to distribute its weight differently among its muscles. Even if 
its offspring were somehow born with all their bones intact (and as Hodgson and Knudsen 
point out, Lamarckian accounts tend to be vague on why offspring do not inherit fractures or 
age-related health problems) the pattern of use and disuse of muscles would still be inherited. 
If this pattern of muscle strength were only compatible with walking in a distorted posture, 
then that posture would be inherited and the offspring would hobble inefficiently from tree to 
tree. Only the possibility of natural selection can distinguish this as an injury by killing off 
giraffe-ancestors which inherited it. If there were no natural selection in the system, 
modifications which resulted from injuries would quickly become ubiquitous – since most 
adults which live long enough to reproduce acquire some injuries along the way.    A 
hobbling giraffe-ancestor in a Lamarckian world could beget many hobbling offspring if it 
had easy access to food and a low probability of encountering a predator. Only the fact that 
life for the ancestors of real giraffes was tough, with regular predation and shortages of food 
and potential mates, explains why the modern giraffe became so ideally-suited to its niche 
within the ecological system. Waltz’s model of the international political system cannot show 
us why states cannot similarly tend to retain traits which are suboptimal for their survival. 
   As Hodgson and Knudsen put it: 
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    Prominent cases of acquired characteristics include injuries and other 
impairments. But, for species to evolve, the effects of such deleterious 
acquired characteristics must be restricted. [...] The only possible 
explanation for the evolution of the limits necessary to filter the many 
useless and injurious characteristics is natural selection. Accordingly, 
Lamarckism depends on the Darwinian principle of selection in order to 
explain why any disastrous propensity to inherit acquired impairments 
does not prevail [...] If Lamarckism is valid in any particular domain, it 
depends on Darwinian mechanisms of selection for evolutionary guidance. 
    Giving serious thought to the implications of Lamarckian inheritance quickly reveals that, 
unless we are to impute some magical drive to perfection to units in a selective system60, it 
needs rapid selection to explain units’ consistent movement towards characteristics and 
behaviours well-suited to their environments. Given the difficulty of identifying beneficial 
behaviours in advance, regular elimination of failing units is needed to distinguish good 
inheritances from bad inheritances61. In other words, even if there is the possibility of 
Lamarckian inheritance, some form of elimination ends up doing all the work which causes 
convergence on traits that are suited to the environment. Without natural selection, 
Lamarckism would spread traits almost randomly. Therefore, imitation of the successful by 
their rivals is unlikely to be sufficient to make states converge on prudent, security-enhancing 
behaviours which are as timeless as Waltz suggests.  
    Waltz’s model seems to explain convergence of behaviours by combining a slow rate of 
natural selection with the rapid imitation of strategies which appear to have been successful 
elsewhere. Unfortunately, in order for natural selection to explain why units in the present 
would converge on particular behaviours, units in the past would need to have been subjected 
to a high degree of selective pressure. Units which existed in the past and were well-suited to 
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their environment would need to exert a very strong influence on how states which exist in 
the present behave; the characteristics of states which did not conform to the logic of anarchy 
would need to be quickly removed from the system. The international system, however, 
combines the possibility of imitating injurious behaviours with a low “death rate”. The 
Lamarckian nature of socialisation suggests divergence from strategies which are objectively 
well-suited to anarchy, the strategies we might be able to predict by reasoning about the 
behaviour of states in an idealised system. Harmful behaviours may be imitated. Because 
imitation is quick, imprudent behaviours can spread much more quickly than the elimination 
and relegation of imitating states by more-successful competitors can keep them in check. 
     Taking account of the quasi-Lamarckian dimension to Waltz’s model actually emphasises 
the importance of elimination in causing systematic convergence of behaviours. If animals 
could inherit acquired characteristics, both characteristics useful to the parents during their 
lifetime and characteristics which result from injuries could be inherited. By the same token, 
if states can imitate each others’ novel institutions and behaviours they might acquire useful 
tools for ensuring their security, but they might also imitate those which will turn out to be 
harmful to the imitated state in the future. The useful characteristics are by definition those 
which will enhance the unit’s chances of surviving at its current position in the system, so it 
is crucial to be able to distinguish one from the other. When we combine the possibility of 
Lamarckian inheritance with natural selection, only natural selection checks the spread of 
injurious characteristics and behaviours. If the rate of natural selection is low, this check 
becomes less effective. If it is low enough (in other words, if survival is easy enough even 
when a unit’s characteristics are suboptimal) acquired injuries may be passed on to new 
generations faster than they can be eliminated.  
    Simply stating that the units are parts of a competitive system62 does not, therefore, tell us 
how they are likely to behave unless we follow it with more assumptions about the nature of 
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that system. Modern Darwinian thought allows for many outcomes of selection, with the 
resulting units showing a wide range of behaviours from extreme egoism to altruism. There 
are many ideas in evolutionary theory which might be significant for international politics. 
Among the most obviously relevant to this discussion are ideas building on William 
Hamilton’s and Richard Dawkins’ work, culminating in the popular theory that genes act as 
the primary units of selection (‘selfish gene’ theory’). This challenges head-on the idea that a 
selective system will lead to self-preserving behaviours becoming ubiquitous. 
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Alternative Outcomes of Selection 
Writing in the nineteenth century, Darwin was unaware that characteristics are inherited 
through discrete genes63. As a result, he tended to focus on competition among individual 
animals to survive and reproduce. In the early twentieth century, Darwinian thought was 
transformed by a synthesis with the genetic theory of inheritance. Modern Darwinism 
acknowledges competition among units for survival and reproductive opportunities, but 
evolution can often be better understood as competition among individual genes for 
expression within a population. Richard Dawkins’ work has been hugely important in 
popularising the idea that the behaviours which spread a gene will not always be those which 
preserve the body it is currently inhabiting: there are many situations in which the selective 
pressures on individual genes and on whole animals diverge. In those situations, the interests 
of the genes take priority64. 
    In the same way, Waltz’s Theory of International Politics can be read better as an account 
of why particular behaviours65 are widespread among major powers than an account of why 
the USA and USSR were major powers. His system punishes and rewards states, but the 
consequence of this is to encourage the spread of self-regarding behaviours at the expense of 
other behaviours. Modern Darwinians can often explain animal evolution better by seeing the 
natural world as an arena in which genes compete against each other, and the victors become 
widespread in the population (the “gene’s-eye view”66). In other words, genes and 
behaviours, not animals and states, are the units of selection. 
    Even though modern Darwinian biologists, like neorealists, see the world as an anarchic 
arena in which competing strategies are tested against each other and the characteristics of the 
winners proliferate, they do not assume that this leads to convergence on self-regarding 
behaviour. In fact, genes which are actively harmful to the survival prospects of the animal 
which carries them can and do proliferate. Worker bees will sacrifice themselves for their 
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nestmates; salmon swim upstream to their deaths every mating season. These behaviours 
perpetuate the genes which cause them even while destroying the body they are currently 
inhabiting67. Treating the gene as the unit of selection, the only criterion for success is that 
more copies of that gene exist in the future than did in the past. The fate of the individual, 
mortal animal which hosts a gene temporarily is largely irrelevant68. For example, modern 
Darwinism can explain why individual animals, such as worker bees which serve the queens 
rather than breeding themselves, will sacrifice their own reproductive capacities and often 
their lives for others; due to a quirk of insect genetics, worker bees get more copies of their 
own genes into future generations of bees by caring for their sisters’ offspring than they 
would by breeding themselves69. Time and again, the evidence has shown that the traits 
which become widespread in animals are not necessarily those which preserve the animals 
that carry them, but rather those which make those animals produce more copies of the trait. 
Logically, this should apply to selective systems in general; the traits widespread in the 
present will be those which were successful in being disseminated in the past. 
    Just as in animals, traits which reduce a unit’s security might proliferate – if they had other 
attributes which made them likely to be copied into other units. This suggests Waltz’s model 
of selection is not the only possibility we can extrapolate from his observation that the 
international-political system is anarchic and selective. Neorealist theory does not, of course, 
offer much of a clue as to what kinds of other factors might affect this likelihood. For that, we 
would need to look elsewhere, perhaps to organisational sociology or studies of scientific 
innovations70 - or even to constructivist ideas.   
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Conclusion 
Modern Darwinians argue convincingly that we can expect units in a selective system to 
converge on the behaviours best-suited to the environment only if units carrying 
inappropriate traits are systematically less likely to reproduce. Waltz concedes that states are 
rarely eliminated from the system, and even the relegation of states from great power status to 
the lower divisions is not common. This makes distinguishing problematic behaviours 
difficult. If states can acquire deleterious characteristics through imitation faster than the 
system punishes them, it is entirely possible for deleterious traits to spread. Waltz’s model 
cannot show us that states’ behaviour will automatically converge around the best means to 
security unless unsuccessful states risk being eliminated, or relegated from the ranks of the 
major powers with which his theory is concerned, faster than they can be imitated.  
    Biologists have observed many empirical cases of behaviours which risk animals’ lives yet 
which still appear to be favoured by the system. This can occur whenever the increased odds 
of a given trait being copied into other units outweigh harm to its current host. Waltz’s model 
does not, by itself, show why the same could not be true in the international political system. 
If the system eliminates/relegates non-conformist states more slowly than states can imitate 
each other, they may converge on imprudent behaviours. While we might be able to deduce 
how states would ideally maintain their security, we do not have an obvious way to predict 
how imprudent imitation might lead them to diverge from this ideal. 
    There has been extensive discussion in the pages of this journal of Waltz’s metatheoretical 
position71. Showing what his model of the international system cannot do may tell us 
something about what it can. Waltz’s many critics may not be quite so far from his pattern of 
reasoning as we often think, because a Darwinian understanding of the international system 
which retained much of his reasoning could also generate very different outcomes from those 
Waltz presents. There is plenty of space for a constructivist, or perhaps even some variants of 
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postmodernist, to argue that their interpretation of how states are likely to behave is 
compatible with modern Darwinian logic. The system need not eliminate behaviours which 
increase a state’s vulnerability, and so they can proliferate according to whether or not they 
appeal socially.  
    A selective system on its own cannot cause its units to converge on prudent behaviours 
unless there is a high death rate. This does not mean that imprudence does not sometimes 
lead to suffering. It is possible that imprudent behaviours will spread even though they 
sometimes lead to suffering. Behaviours might seem appealing, and be widely imitated, even 
if they are bad for the survival prospects of the state that imitates them. Anarchy does not 
preclude this. If the system is left to follow its natural course, imprudent behaviours may 
spread faster than the system can feed back that they are imprudent. 
    There is also a human dimension. Waltz’s model has many Darwinian characteristics, but 
there is more going on. A fundamentalist Darwinian understanding of the world generates its 
own rationality. All that matters is the spread of traits, and a good trait is a ‘fit’ trait, one 
which gets itself copies into future generations of hosts. There is no need to assume that the 
units start out as rational actors, because the system is self-regulating in a particularly brutal 
way. The ecological system eliminates genes that are not good at getting their hosts to make 
more copies of them, until it is filled with animals carrying genes that are good at getting 
themselves copied. A curious kind of rationality emerges from such a system, where all that 
matters is replication. In principle we could, with enough information and imagination, 
predict how animals will behave by calculating what behaviours would be most likely to get 
their genes copied. To some extent we do this all the time. Pet owners can safely predict that 
their animals will pursue food and sex and avoid pain: thinking through the logic of this, they 
are in effect reasoning that pets will do the things that increase their chances of leaving 
offspring in the wild. Waltz could be interpreted as implying that the international-political 
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system has its own internally-generated rationality of survival72. I am sceptical that the model 
he outlines would necessarily generate an ‘emergent’ rationality in this way as a result of 
behavioural convergence. But this may miss the more important distinction between Waltz 
and Darwin. It would be worrying if any political analyst were so caught up in the emergent 
rationality of a Darwinian system as to lose sight of the implications for other humans.   
    A self-regulating system is unmoved by the suffering of the units that constitute it, or the 
cells that constitute them. Political life, on the other hand, generates and ameliorates 
suffering. Waltz, unlike Darwinists who study animals, plants, and microbes, might plausibly 
hope to improve lives by describing the world in one way and not in another. The minds that 
influence how political units behave may be open to human persuasion. And taking Waltz’s 
work as a whole, he makes a far-from-trivial case that the system would cause less suffering 
if states behaved as if the system compelled them to be prudent.    
    If Waltz does not show that the system generates an emergent rationality in its units, then 
this only increases the importance of debate about his work as a policy prescription. If 
imprudent behaviour can spread, despite its costs, then encouraging states to take the course 
most likely to ensure their security becomes crucial. And Waltz has a normative commitment 
to the security of what he values73. Darwinian ideas are useful for interpreting Waltz, but 
Waltz – unlike a biologist – has the option of trying to find the course which will minimise 
human suffering and persuading units to follow it.  
    Encouraging states to behave like rational power-seekers might have positive 
consequences. Waltz’s model simply does not show that they will do so if left alone to 
interact. Thus, the normative commitment takes on greater importance. We need not interpret 
Theory of International Politics as a positive model of how the world must be. States could 
choose to heed the siren calls to imitate imprudent policies, and the system could not prevent 
them. I suggest that, for Waltz, this is the whole point of pleading with them not to. 
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